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A FALSE DILEMMA FOR 
ANTI-INDIVIDUALISM
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§I. Introduction
Conceived very broadly, anti-individu-
alism is a negative thesis.1 According to 
anti-individualism, a specification of an 
individual’s physical and phenomenological 
states and non-intentionally characterized 
functionalistic and dispositional properties is 
insuffi cient for a specifi cation of many of the 
individual’s mental states. A more specifi c, 
positive version of anti-individualism holds 
that the natures of many of mental states 
are partly but constitutively determined by 
patterns of relations which hold between 
the individual and the wider physical and/or 
social reality. 
It is often presupposed that an anti-in-
dividualist about representational mental 
states must choose between two accounts of 
no-reference cases. One option is said to be 
an “illusion of thought” version according 
to which the subject in a no-reference case 
fails to think a fi rst-order thought but rather 
has the illusion of having one. The other is a 
“descriptive” version according to which one 
thinks an empty thought via a description.
While this presupposition is not un-
common, it rarely surfaces in an explicit 
manner. Often, it is visible only when a 
theorist argues directly from the falsity of 
one of the two views to the truth of the other. 
However, Jessica Brown’s recent work on 
anti-individualism clearly illustrates the 
presupposition. Hence, her treatment of the 
issue may serve to structure the discussion. 
However, the aim of the discussion is entirely 
general. Arguments for two conclusions about 
the nature of anti-individualism will be set 
forth. First, the choice between the illusion 
and descriptive version of anti-individualism 
is a dilemma. Each version of anti-individual-
ism is prone to problems. Second, the choice 
is a false dilemma. There is another, less 
problematic, anti-individualistic account of 
reference failure.
§II. On Leaving Out What 
Anti-Individualism Is Like
Why think that an anti-individualist must 
choose between two unattractive accounts 
of reference failure? A clear articulation of 
what will be argued to be a false dilemma 
for anti-individualism may be found in 
Jessica Brown’s treatment of no-reference 
cases. Consequently, her treatment may 
serve as a concrete point of departure for 
the general investigation. In introducing the 
topic of reference failure, Brown plainly as-
sumes that “There are two different views 
about no-reference cases available to an anti-
individualist” (Brown 2004, p. 16). The fi rst 
of the two views is a ‘descriptive version.’ 
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This is the view that “in a no-reference case, 
the subject thinks about the putative object 
via a description” (ibid.). Since the cases 
in question involve purported reference to a 
particular object or a natural kind, the view 
requires that the subject’s thought has the 
form of a (defi nite) description. 
The other candidate anti-individualist ac-
count of no-reference cases is ‘the illusion 
version’ according to which “the subject 
fails to think a thought of the relevant kind 
at all” (Brown 2004, p. 16). According to the 
‘illusion version,’ a subject in a no-reference 
case “takes herself to be thinking a thought 
when she is not” (ibid., p. 114). The illusion 
version of anti-individualism entails what 
may be labeled ‘the doctrine of ontological 
dependence.’ According to this doctrine, the 
existence of a singular thought with a de-
terminate content entails that the object (or 
kind) which the thought is about exists or has 
existed in the individual’s environment. Thus, 
some thoughts are said to be object-dependent 
(or kind-dependent). 
The distinction between these two versions 
of anti-individualism is an important one. But 
Brown’s presentation, and subsequent discus-
sion, of it suggests that the anti-individualist 
is rationally committed to a choice between 
these two accounts of no-reference cases. 
That is, Brown does not consider a non-de-
scriptivist anti-individualist who denies that 
thoughts are object (or kind) dependent. 
This is peculiar insofar as anti-individual-
ism as originally developed by Tyler Burge 
rejects both descriptivism and the doctrine 
of ontological dependence. Burge provides 
a number of examples which he takes to 
show that an individual may acquire, possess, 
and use a concept which she understands 
incompletely. Someone who thinks that a 
contract must be written and signed simply 
has a false belief about contracts. This view 
is not consistent with descriptivism about 
concepts (Burge 1979, passim). Elsewhere 
Burge makes it quite explicit that he rejects 
the doctrine of ontological dependence: “it 
is logically possible for an individual to have 
beliefs involving the concept of water (alu-
minum, and so on), even though there exists 
no water” (Burge 2007a, pp. 96–97). Many, 
perhaps most, anti-individualists subscribe to 
this much of the original version of the theory. 
For example, a recent anti-individualist ac-
count of empty thought components which 
rejects both descriptivism and the doctrine 
of ontological dependence is provided by 
Sanford Goldberg (Goldberg 2006).
Thus, Brown appears to leave out the 
original and continuously prominent ver-
sion of anti-individualism.2 The issue is of 
general signifi cance. If the choice between 
the descriptivist and the illusion versions 
of anti-individualism is indeed mandatory, 
a major revision of anti-individualistic phi-
losophy of mind is rationally required. Inter-
estingly, Brown does not take the allegedly 
mandatory choice for the anti-individualist 
to be a dilemma. Rather, she defends each 
version against epistemological objections: 
“In the rest of the book, I will consider both 
illusion and descriptive versions of singular 
and natural kind anti-individualism” (Brown 
2004, pp. 17).
Brown’s defense in the epistemological 
realm will not be the subject of the subsequent 
discussion. Rather, it will be argued that there 
are general, non-epistemological reasons to 
reject the illusion version and the descrip-
tive version of anti-individualism. These 
arguments are part of a general investigation 
pertaining to the nature of anti-individual-
ism. The investigation may begin by briefl y 
considering an alternative anti-individualist 
account of no-references. It seems that an 
anti-individualist may subscribe to a ‘false 
fi rst-order thought’-account of no-reference 
cases. The false thought view, (FT), may be 
characterized as follows:
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(FT): In many no-reference cases, the subject 
is having a false fi rst-order thought 
(with determinate content).
While (FT) will be advocated over the illu-
sion version and the descriptive version, it is 
important to be aware of its scope and limits. 
For example, it may be that in some cases, 
an empty thought lacks a truth value. The 
quantifi cation ‘many’ in (FT) indicates that 
such cases, if any, are plausibly exceptions to 
the rule that in no-reference cases, the subject 
entertains a false fi rst-order thought. There 
are further reasons for quantifying (FT) by 
‘many’ rather than ‘every.’ For example, it is 
natural to regard the thought ‘unicorns do not 
exist’ as true. But this hardly compromises 
the spirit of (FT). Plausibly, the thought is 
true because it is a fi rst-order thought with a 
determinate content. 
Moreover, thoughts that involve demonstra-
tive or indexical components raise distinctive 
sets of problems. Consider, for example, 
perceptual beliefs which plausibly contain 
a demonstrative ‘that’-component. Burge 
and others have argued that perceptual be-
liefs, such as ‘that object is round,’ require a 
contextual application for their completion 
(Burge 1977, Segal 1989). Considered in the 
abstract, as unapplied, such thoughts lack a 
determinate content and, hence, a truth-value. 
It is not clear how to treat such thoughts when 
they fail to refer in the context of application. 
For example, it is unclear how to account for 
the contextually applied non-referring empty 
thoughts such as the hallucinatory thought 
‘that elephant is pink’ or the perceptual be-
lief ‘that pool of water is deep’ in an illusory 
environment. However, it is doubtful that 
anti-individualism is inconsistent with the 
view that such contextually applied thoughts 
are false.
In the forthcoming discussion, these com-
plex matters will largely be set aside. Some 
no-reference cases, such as those involving 
empty demonstrative thoughts, may well 
require special treatment. However, such 
special kinds of treatments may plausibly be 
regarded as supplementary to (FT) rather than 
as principles competing with the account. 
The formulation of (FT) allows for such 
supplementation.
A central difference between (FT) and the 
illusion version of anti-individualism is this: 
Whereas the illusion version of anti-indi-
vidualism entails a version of the doctrine 
of ontological dependence, (FT) does not. 
Does the rejection of the illusion version in 
favor of (FT) commit the anti-individualist to 
descriptivism about empty concepts? It will 
be argued that, fortunately, it does not. 
A non-descriptivist anti-individualist may 
take the position that a thought about an 
object or a natural kind can fail to refer and 
still have determinate content. For example, 
an anti-individualist may uphold the view that 
‘ether is common’ is false. According to one 
version of this view, Sally may be prone to a 
perceptual illusion that there is a red apple. 
If so, she may think ‘that apple is red.’ In 
doing so, she has a thought with determinate 
content. The thought is in singular form. That 
is, it purports to refer to a particular object. 
Moreover, the anti-individualist may argue 
that the empty thought is of the same kind or 
type as a true, and hence referring, perceptual 
thought ‘that apple is red.’ That is, the anti-
individualist may be a common factor theorist 
about singular thought.
One consideration which indicates that 
the choice between the descriptive version 
and the illusion version is not mandatory 
is this: A Twin-Earth argument for anti-in-
dividualism appears to be as plausible for 
empty, non-descriptive concepts as it does 
for referring concepts. To see this, consider 
the internalistically specifi ed twins, Annika 
and Twin-Annika, living on Earth and Twin-
Earth, respectively. On Earth, the scientists 
subscribe to a theory according to which 
phlogiston is a substance which plays a 
role in combustion, but not in corrosion. 
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On Twin-Earth, the accepted theory has it 
that phlogiston plays a role in corrosion, but 
not combustion. Of course, both theories 
are mistaken. There is no substance of the 
relevant kind on either Earth or Twin-Earth. 
Annika acquires the concept of phlogiston 
without coming to possess any description 
of it (perhaps apart from the belief that it is 
a substance of scientifi c interest). A similar 
story may be told about Twin-Annika. An 
anti-individualist may argue from this set-up 
that Annika and Twin-Annika have acquired 
distinct concepts of phlogiston. Importantly, 
such an argument typically relies on the as-
sumption that the subjects do not think about 
the substance ‘via a description’ but rather de-
fer to the established use in their community 
(Burge 1979). Such a Twin-Earth argument 
concludes some empty, non-descriptive con-
cepts are anti-individualistically individuated. 
This conclusion is incompatible with both the 
illusion version and the descriptive version. 
So, it seems that the choice between the illu-
sion and descriptive accounts of no-reference 
cases is not mandatory for the anti-individual-
ist. Consequently, the reasons for upholding 
these versions of anti-individualism should 
be critically scrutinized.
§III. Against Illusions of Thought
The illusion version is the view that a sub-
ject in a no-reference case takes herself to 
be thinking a thought even though she is not 
(Brown 2004, Evans 1982, McDowell 1986). 
As mentioned, the view sets forth an ontologi-
cal requirement on having a thought with a 
determinate content: Successful reference to 
the object or natural kind in question. 
For orientation, it is worth noting that 
the illusion version is intimately associated 
with a radical version of anti-individualism 
often called ‘disjunctivism.’ This is the view 
that there is no type of mental state (of any 
explanatory relevance) in common between 
any of the following cases: (i) a case in which 
Sally sees an apple, A, (ii) a case in which 
Sally sees a different, but indiscriminable, 
apple, B, (iii) a no-reference case in which 
Sally is prone to an optical illusion of an apple 
and (iv) a no-reference case in which Sally, 
say due to a drug, is prone to a hallucination 
of an apple. So, according to the disjunctivist, 
one succeeds in thinking a thought about an 
apple, only if there is an apple present. Thus, 
the doctrine of ontological dependence is en-
tailed by disjunctivism. Although the illusion 
version is not straightforwardly entailed by 
disjunctivism, it seems to be called for. For 
how else could a disjunctivist account for the 
fact that there is, from a fi rst-person perspec-
tive, an appearance of a thought with deter-
minate content in a no-reference case? So, if 
the illusion version is implausible, it appears 
that disjunctivism is also in trouble.3
A core assumption of the illusion version 
is that the individual in a no-reference case 
wrongly takes herself to think a thought. But it 
is far from obvious how the notion of “taking” 
should be understood. However, the range 
of available answers may be constrained by 
noting that individuals in no-reference cases 
often continue to engage in theoretical and 
practical reasoning. Since reasoning is propo-
sitional, the “taking” in question must consist 
in a propositional attitude. It is a familiar fact 
that non-propositional states cannot stand in 
logical relations to propositional attitudes.4
In consequence, the illusion version can-
not consist in the view that the agent in a 
no-reference case lacks a fi rst-order thought 
but retains the phenomenal content normally 
associated with it.5 For phenomenal con-
tent—the way it is like to think a thought—is 
not propositional.6 Although we may reason 
about phenomenal states, those states do not 
themselves enter into the reasoning. Only 
propositional attitudes do. Hence, the ‘tak-
ing’ essential to the illusion version must 
be accounted for in terms of a propositional 
attitude.
In consequence, a species of the illusion 
version according to which an illusion of 
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a thought consists in a false second-order 
thought will be considered. Such illusion of 
thought theory, (IT), may be formulated as 
follows: 
(IT):  In a no-reference case, the subject does 
not have a fi rst-order thought (with 
determinate content). Rather she is 
having an illusory (hence false) sec-
ond-order thought that she is having a 
fi rst-order thought.
While (IT) provides a more tangible target 
theory, it is still not quite clear what the ‘tak-
ing’ consists in. In particular, the content of 
the illusory second-order thought remains 
to be specifi ed. There are a number of pos-
sible specifi cations of which two will be 
considered. 
The second-order thought may be said to 
have some sort of existentially quantifi ed 
content. For example, ‘there is a thought with 
this-and-that content.’ However, such a view 
would be prone to a vicious regress problem. 
Recall that according to the illusion version, 
there are no fi rst-order thoughts in no-refer-
ence cases. Hence, according to the illusion 
version, the relevant second-order thoughts 
themselves exemplify a no-reference case. 
That is, if there is no referent of the second-
order thought (i.e., no fi rst-order thought), 
then given the illusion version of no-reference 
cases, there is no second-order thought with 
determinate content. But, if so, an explanation 
of the phenomenon of an apparent thought in 
terms of a (false) third-order thought would 
also be an instance of a no-reference case. 
And so on without end.
However, the regress may be stopped by a 
different specifi cation of the content of the 
second-order thought according to which it 
contains egocentric indexing elements. For 
instance, ‘I think that yetis are dangerous.’ 
Since the thinker exists, this thought is non-
empty. It merely ascribes some false prop-
erty, that of having a certain thought, to the 
thinker.7 On this account, no regress arises.
This way of understanding the notion of 
“taking oneself to think a thought” renders it 
reasonably clear what is meant by the “tak-
ing” in question. It is also compatible with 
Brown’s characterization that in a no-refer-
ence case “the subject fails to think a thought 
of the relevant kind at all” (Brown 2004, p. 
16, my italics) Moreover, the view accord-
ing to which one thinks a false second-order 
thought about one’s own mind is not prone 
to the problems to which other species of 
the illusion version are prone. So, it seems 
appropriate to make it the target of criticism. 
However, many of the problems which will 
be raised for it will apply mutatis mutandis 
to alternative versions.
The illusion version, in all its forms, in-
volves the view that the subject in a no-refer-
ence case fails to have a fi rst-order thought 
with determinate content. This core assump-
tion is unattractive for a number of reasons. 
Contrast, for example, the two thoughts 
which Sally might entertain:
(i) There are unicorns in Kashmir.
(ii) There are gnomes in Kashmir.
In each case, it seems that Sally is thinking 
something. Something false to be sure—but 
nevertheless something determinate. Intui-
tively, the thought that there are unicorns in 
Kashmir is very different from the thought 
that there are gnomes (or yetis or dragons) 
in Kashmir. That those thoughts are different 
is as solid an intuition about thoughts as is 
available to a philosopher of mind. If it cannot 
be regarded as data, then there is very little 
which can be regard as data about thoughts.
Furthermore, it seems clear that Sally might 
infer from ‘there are unicorns in Kashmir’ 
to ‘there is something in Kashmir.’ But ac-
cording to the illusion-of-thought version 
under consideration, the reasoning should 
be represented as follows: ‘I think that there 
are unicorns in Kashmir,’ ‘so, there is some-
thing in Kashmir.’ So, according to the view 
334  / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
under consideration, the reasoning should be 
regarded as invalid or, at least, as enthyme-
matic. This is not a very charitable conception 
of Sally’s thinking. 
Moreover, it seems that a theorist who 
denies that the apparent thoughts differ 
would stand little chance of explaining the 
relationship between thought and action. 
Someone who believed (i) might well go to 
Kashmir—of all places—in search of the 
unicorns. Someone who believed (ii), but 
not (i), would probably not. Or at least, she 
would, ceteris paribus, not be rational in do-
ing so.8 So, an anti-individualist account of 
thought-individuation must make sense of the 
apparent difference between (i) and (ii).
But on the illusion-of-thought view char-
acterized by (IT), the apparent difference 
between (i) and (ii) is hard to make sense of. 
If Sally fails to think anything determinate 
in each case, how is the apparent difference 
between (i) and (ii) to be explained? And how 
is Sally’s trip to Kashmir to be explained? 
The theorist subscribing to the illusion ver-
sion characterized by (IT) would have to say 
that the seeming difference between (i) and 
(ii) is to be explained in virtue of the fact that 
Sally entertains two distinct second-order at-
titudes. Likewise, her journey to Kashmir is to 
be explained by the fact that she mistakenly 
thinks that she believes that there are unicorns 
in Kashmir. 
Such an account seems strained beyond the 
breaking point for a number of reasons. First 
of all, it is not plausible to assume that one has 
a second-order attitude in every no-reference 
case. Sally may experience an illusion of an 
apple at the table. It seems quite clear that 
Sally’s “taking it” that there is an apple on the 
table may consist in mental representations at 
many levels. It may be propositional or not. 
It may be conscious or not. In each case, it 
seems implausible that just because Sally’s 
(possibly unconscious) doxastic representa-
tion ‘there is an apple on the table’ is non-
referential, it involves a second-order attitude. 
Indeed, it is unclear how an unconscious 
sub-propositional representation could be the 
subject of a second-order attitude.9
There is another reason why it is implau-
sible that a simple empirical mistake—about 
what is on the table—amounts to a complex 
mistake about one’s own mental states. Young 
children and higher animals are suffi ciently 
sophisticated to engage in basic reasoning. 
But they are not sophisticated enough to 
have second-order thoughts.10 Nevertheless, 
they may clearly be subjects in no-reference 
cases. For example, they may be prone to 
perceptual illusions. The proponent of the 
illusion version must reject this possibility. 
However, we often explain the behavior of 
young children and higher animals by ref-
erence to their non-referential attitudes. A 
chimp will pursue an illusion of a banana. 
We explain this by ascribing to it the belief 
that there is a banana.
So, the (IT) theorist owes us a principled 
psychological explanation of why Sally fails 
to have a thought in the non-referential case 
when she succeeds in having a thought or rep-
resentation in the veridical case. It seems that 
in many cases there are no differences, which 
are relevant for psychological explanation, 
between the type of cognitive processes that 
are operative in the veridical and no-reference 
cases. Importantly, this fact is not altered by 
the anti-individualistic assumption that those 
process types, and the mental state types they 
result in, are in part determined by patterns 
of relations holding between the individual 
and her normal environment. So, there is no 
characteristically anti-individualist reason to 
think that there is a radical difference in the 
psychological profi le of someone prone to an 
apple illusion and someone who entertains a 
true apple-belief.11 
Moreover, it is not clear that the illusion-
of-thought theorist may consistently accept 
that Sally has a fi rst-order desire to fi nd the 
unicorns despite being unable to have a fi rst-
order thought about unicorns. One would 
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think that all propositional attitudes should 
have similar individuation-conditions. If so, it 
seems that the advocate of the illusion version 
must make plausible the idea of second-order 
desires. Indeed, she must make plausible the 
view that it is always second-order attitudes 
which are involved in psychological expla-
nation of no-reference cases. To illustrate 
the diffi culties with this approach, consider 
how the proponent of the illusion version can 
make sense of the child’s fear of the infamous 
monster under the bed. By appeal to the idea 
that he believes that he fears a monster? By 
appeal to the idea that he fears that he fears a 
monster? It is far more natural to say that the 
child fears, although mistakenly, a monster.
Most of these worries challenge the plausi-
bility of the sort of psychological explanation 
which is available to a proponent of the illu-
sion version. Many of these worries should 
be equally worrisome for a disjunctivist. 
Nevertheless, the proponents of the illusion 
version (and disjunctivism) have done little to 
counter the worries regarding psychological 
explanation. 
But the problems for the illusion version 
go well beyond psychological explanation. It 
seems, moreover, that the view is incapable 
of accounting for the intuitive difference in 
content of any two second-order attitudes 
which are posited in order to explain away 
the appearance of fi rst-order thoughts. Ac-
cording to a prominent anti-individualist 
account of beliefs about one’s own mind, the 
content of a second-order attitude is partly 
determined by the content of the fi rst-order 
attitude which it is about (Burge 1988, Heil 
1988). But, according to the radical assump-
tion, there is no fi rst-order thought with any 
determinate content in a non-reference case. 
So, this natural account of second-order 
thought-individuation is unavailable to the 
illusion version.
Recall that present aim is to motivate the 
claim that the (FT) version should not be 
left out. This preceding discussion has not 
considered every conceivable species of the 
illusion version of anti-individualism. Per-
haps, some illusion-theorists have not had 
second-order thoughts in mind. However, 
given the problems with alternative concep-
tions of ‘taking oneself to think a thought,’ it 
is far from clear what they have had in mind. 
Consequently, a clear version of the illusion 
version of anti-individualism has been the 
subject of the present criticism. That said, 
some principled problems which any illu-
sion-of-thought theorist must confront have 
been indicated. 
The central problem is that the illusion 
version, in all its forms, entails a strikingly 
problematic view about the nature of the 
mistake which is made by the subject in a 
no-reference case. According to the illusion 
version, an individual in a no-reference case 
is radically mistaken about the nature of her 
own mind rather than about the nature of the 
world.12 This is a very odd way to conceive 
of the situation. The phenomena which 
have been called to attention challenge this 
conception. A subject in a no-reference case 
will continue to make certain practical and 
theoretical inferences about the world and 
continue with world-directed action. In many 
cases, the best explanation of this is that the 
subject holds a false belief about the world.
These challenges to the illusion version of 
anti-individualism (many of which also ap-
ply to the motivating view: Disjunctivism) 
may not be conclusive. But in the absence of 
cogent answers to them, they weigh heavily 
against the illusion version (and against dis-
junctivism). Fortunately, an anti-individualist 
can reject (IT), and similar views, in favor of 
(FT). And, indeed, many anti-individualists 
do. It should therefore be considered whether 
such a rejection entails any commitment to 
descriptivism.
§IV. Against Descriptivism
The investigation may begin by noting that 
anti-individualists are typically very liberal 
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with respect to concept acquisition and pos-
session. One reason for this liberalism is that 
one might acquire a concept by fantasizing 
or theorizing or by picking it up by defer-
ence in a linguistic community where it is 
expressed by a common (or singular) name. 
Such liberalism is integral to the original 
strand of anti-individualism. Indeed, it plays 
a central role in some of the arguments for 
it (Burge 1979). Moreover, as argued in §II, 
an anti-individualist can provide a version of 
a Twin Earth argument which concludes that 
an individual can think empty non-descrip-
tive thoughts. 
Descriptivism about concepts comes in 
many forms. According to a prominent ver-
sion of the view, a thinker possesses a con-
cept only if she associates with it a defi nite 
description of the kind of thing falling under 
the concept. The view is said to resolve the 
problem about empty thoughts because it 
does not require that the defi nite descrip-
tion be ‘proper’ in David Kaplan’s sense of 
succeeding in referring uniquely (Kaplan 
1970).
It is important to note that descriptivism 
involves the view that the structure of the sub-
ject’s thought is descriptive. It is not merely 
the claim that some description or property 
is associated with the concept. Brown’s for-
mulation of the descriptive version provides 
a good characterization of this general feature 
of it. She characterizes the descriptive version 
to be the view that “in a no-reference case, the 
subject thinks about the putative object via a 
description” (Brown 2004, p. 16).
However, any substantive version of de-
scriptivism may be comfortably rejected 
by an anti-individualist who denies (IT). It 
is perfectly consistent with such a version 
of anti-individualism that one can have a 
non-descriptive thought in singular form. 
Consider, for example, the false thought ‘the 
vase is pretty’—although there is no vase. 
Similarly, descriptivism about non-referen-
tial concepts may be the view that a subject 
possesses such a concept only if ‘the subject 
thinks about the putative kind or property via 
a description.’ If so, the view may be rejected 
by the anti-individualist who rejects the ‘il-
lusion version’ and embraces something 
like (FT). Consider, for example, the case in 
which Sally acquires an empty concept by 
deference to the customary use of the word 
which expresses the concept. It seems clear 
that such deference does not require that she 
entertains a description whenever she thinks 
a thought involving the concept. And it seems 
plausible that she need not associate a defi -
nite description with the concept in order to 
think with it.
A further question about the descriptivism 
in question pertains to its scope. It is a much 
stronger claim to suppose that all concepts are 
descriptive than to suppose that only empty 
concepts are descriptive. Advocates of the 
descriptive version are often elusive on this 
issue. But Brown takes a clear stand: “Even 
if Sally thinks a descriptive thought in te no-
reference case, this does not entail that she 
thinks a descriptive thought when things go 
well” (Brown 2004, p. 16)
The point about entailment is well made 
and taken. Yet it might be thought that de-
scriptivism about empty concepts is plau-
sible only if descriptivism about concepts 
is generally plausible. One reason to think 
so is that referring and empty concepts may 
be acquired in relevantly similar ways. The 
mode of concept-acquisition in, say, a case 
of a referring natural kind concept may be 
relevantly similar to the mode of concept-ac-
quisition in a no-reference case involving an 
empty natural kind concept. For example, it 
seems that Jimmy could acquire the concepts 
of oxygen and phlogiston in manners which 
are relevantly similar. His teacher might tell 
him that oxygen exists on Earth (without 
providing any description). But his evil twin 
teacher might tell him that phlogiston exists 
on Earth (also without providing any descrip-
tion). But if Jimmy acquires a non-descriptive 
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concept in the oxygen case, then it is hard to 
see what grounds the view that he acquires 
a descriptive concept in the phlogiston case. 
If two concepts are acquired, understood 
and used in relevantly similar ways, it seems 
implausible that they differ with respect to 
whether they are descriptive. So, in lieu of 
an argument that all concepts are descriptive, 
descriptivism about empty concepts appears 
to be ungrounded. Conversely, someone who 
thinks that descriptivism is a required posi-
tion in no-reference cases but not in normal 
cases owes an account of wherein the differ-
ence lies.13
There may be an interesting wrinkle here. 
Perhaps a plausible, but much weaker, ver-
sion of descriptivism is available. According 
to this view, an empty concept must be as-
sociated with some description by someone 
in the community in which the concept is 
used and expressed by, say, a natural kind 
term. This is because it is hard to see how an 
empty empirical concept could otherwise ‘get 
off the ground’ by the normal means. Hence, 
according to a ‘weak descriptivism,’ an empty 
concept must be launched by a description. 
Perhaps this account has some plausibility for 
certain empty theoretical concepts. But we 
should be cautious about extrapolating from 
such cases to the conjecture that all empty 
concepts are launched by descriptions. At 
least three reasons to doubt such a conjecture 
are worth mentioning briefl y.14 
First, it seems to be perfectly possible that 
a subject may have an empty color(shade)-
concept. But color-concepts are hardly 
descriptive. 
Second, it is not clear that concepts such 
as ‘yeti’ or ‘gnome’ are descriptive. Even 
though someone who believes in yetis and 
gnomes associates certain properties with 
them, such associations need not amount to 
defi nite descriptions. 
Third, the view is not even generally plau-
sible for the best candidate, namely, empty 
scientifi c kind terms such as ‘phlogiston’ 
and ‘ether.’ Even though a scientist believes 
that some defi nite description is true of the 
alleged referent, she hardly thinks that the 
referent is ‘whatever meets the description.’ 
Rather, a good scientist should recognize the 
possibility of discoveries which are contrary 
to the description which she takes to pick out 
the alleged natural kind.
So, the view that some empty natural kind 
concepts are descriptive in the weak sense 
that they were introduced by a description is 
less objectionable. But even if such a view 
were accepted by the anti-individualist who 
rejects (IT), it would not commit her to any 
substantive version of descriptivism: Even 
if an empty concept, C, must be associated 
with a defi nite description, D, by someone at 
some time, it is not the case that a particular 
subject who thinks a thought involving C 
thinks via D.
It is widely accepted that although a con-
cept has been launched by a defi nite descrip-
tion, this fact does not impose any special 
constraint on an individual thinker’s acqui-
sition and use of it. In particular, the thinker 
need not think the description in order to 
acquire and subsequently possess the concept. 
Nor is he ipso facto thinking via the initial 
description whenever he utilizes the concept 
in thought. Once the descriptive concept is 
‘off the ground,’ it works just like a normal 
non-descriptive concept. In this connection, 
it should be reemphasized that the relevant 
strand of descriptivism is a view about the 
structure of a subject’s thought when her 
thinking involves an empty concept. 
An (FT)-style anti-individualist account 
of no-reference cases appears to be entirely 
compatible with the denial of the ‘descriptive 
version’ even if the existence of descriptive 
concepts is accepted. As mentioned, anti-
individualists typically do reject substantive 
versions of descriptivism. And this is not a 
mere fl uke. Rather, it is an integral aspect 
of an important strand of anti-individualism 
that there is an important distinction to be 
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drawn between concept-possession and con-
cept-mastery. It is one of the cornerstones of 
anti-individualism that the social and environ-
mental conditions relevant for an individual’s 
concept-possession often go well beyond 
her own cognitive grasp of the concept. As 
mentioned, the contention that such social 
and environmental conditions are concept-
individuating would lose one of its central 
motivations of there were no such discrep-
ancy. Indeed, one of the important upshots 
of anti-individualism is that an individual can 
acquire, possess and make use of a concept 
even though the individual does not associate 
it with a proper defi nite description. For this 
reason, anti-individualism is often understood 
as an extension to the philosophy of mind of 
the anti-descriptivist revolution in the philos-
ophy of language.15 Moreover, there is good 
introspective evidence to the effect that for 
most concepts, normal thinkers do not associ-
ate anything more than a few, often inessen-
tial, or mistaken, properties with a concept. 
(Of course, as far as introspective evidence 
goes, one can only speak for oneself. But if 
the testimonial evidence from Hilary Putnam 
(Putnam 1974) and others is to be trusted, the 
phenomenon of incomplete understanding is 
widespread.) Furthermore, higher animals 
and young children may possess concepts, at 
least basic perceptual ones. But they hardly 
associate any descriptions with them. If so, 
it is implausible that an animal or young 
child who is prone to a perceptual illusion is 
‘thinking via a description.’ 
These phenomena lend weight to anti-
descriptivism about concepts in general. As 
mentioned, the ‘description version’ may be 
weakened considerably. Yet there is a limit 
to how much it can be weakened and remain 
a ‘description version.’ A “descriptivism” 
which merely requires that the thinker typi-
cally associates a few contingent properties 
with a given concept is hardly worthy of 
its name. Consequently, it is reasonable to 
conclude that anti-individualists who reject 
the illusion version may also reject the de-
scriptive version. Indeed, refl ections on the 
motivation for anti-individualism suggest that 
anti-individualists should reject any substan-
tive descriptivism.
§VI. Concluding Remarks
It has been argued that the choice between 
‘the illusion version’ and ‘the description ver-
sion’ regarding no-reference cases constitutes 
a false dilemma for the anti-individualist. It 
constitutes a dilemma for two reasons: First, 
each of the two versions of anti-individualism 
is prone to serious problems. Second, each of 
the two versions is in internal confl ict with 
fundamental tenets of anti-individualism. 
The choice makes for a false dilemma 
because it is by no means mandatory. There 
is a prominent version of anti-individualism, 
indeed the original version, according to 
which a thinker simply thinks a false fi rst-
order thought in many no-reference cases. 
Of course, this version of anti-individualism 
should be developed to include a principled 
account of no-reference cases. No such ac-
count has been developed here. It has merely 
been argued that such an anti-individualistic 
account of no-reference cases is more promis-
ing than the illusion and descriptive versions. 
It may be worthwhile to conclude with an 
extremely rough gesture towards the episte-
mological signifi cance of the issue. 
Brown sums up what might well be regard-
ed as the fundamental mistake underlying the 
false dilemma: “whichever view is correct, in 
the no-reference situation, the subject lacks 
the thought she has in the actual situation” 
(Brown 2004, p. 116). The (FT)-version of 
anti-individualism is fundamentally different 
from the descriptive and illusion versions in 
this regard. As mentioned, it is compatible 
with a common factor view. This is, very 
roughly, the view that an individual may 
entertain two beliefs which are of the same 
representational nature or type although only 
one of them is successfully referring.
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The fact that an anti-individualistic account 
of no-reference cases is compatible with such 
a common factor view is epistemologically 
important. For whether an individual is war-
ranted in a particular belief depends, in part, 
on its general representational nature or type. 
This, in turn, is partly because the epistemic 
status of a given belief partly depends on the 
nature of the cognitive processes and compe-
tencies which help type-identify it. If so, it 
is reasonable to hypothesize that a common 
factor view may contribute to an account of 
warranted non-referring belief.
Indeed, it is important for a general account 
of fallible warrant that successfully referring 
beliefs may be of the same kind or type as 
beliefs which ‘misfi re.’ In many no-reference 
cases, an individual in epistemically abnor-
mal circumstances holds a non-referring 
belief which is of a truth-conducive nature. 
However, since the circumstances are abnor-
mal, they may not bear on the general nature 
or type of the belief. If so, the truth-conducive 
nature of the non-referring belief may partly 
explain why it is warranted despite failing to 
refer. If so, it may be conjectured that an anti-
individualistic version of a common factor 
view may contribute to a principled account 
of warranted non-referring belief. However, 
such a putative epistemological corollary 
requires much development and argument. In 
consequence, it is left as a conjecture.
However, the conclusion within the philos-
ophy of mind—that the allegedly mandatory 
choice between the illusion and descriptive 
versions is a false dilemma—is very impor-
tant in its own right. If it is true, we should 
develop the original version of anti-individu-
alism to account for no-reference cases rather 
than revise it dramatically. Moreover, it is im-
portant to realize that each of the alternative 
versions is subject to principled problems. 
Finally, if the epistemological conjecture is 
true, it is no less important for understanding 
anti-individualism’s epistemological implica-
tions. In consequence, it should be investi-
gated how the version of anti-individualism 
which the false dilemma leaves out bears on 
epistemological issues (and vice versa).
University of California, Los Angeles
NOTES
1. I owe thanks to Tyler Burge, Martin Davies, Sanford Goldberg, Mark Greenberg, Peter Ludlow, 
and the participants of a Danish Epistemology Network workshop at The University of Copenhagen. I 
owe special thanks to Jessica Brown and very special thanks to Julie Brummer. The paper is dedicated 
to Alberte.
2. Brown has noted, in conversation, that her intention is not to rule out other versions of anti-indi-
vidualism. Nevertheless, by leaving out other versions of the discussion, she strongly suggests that the 
choice between the illusion version and the descriptive version is mandatory.
 Interestingly, it is also common to presuppose that a Fregean anti-individualist is committed to the 
unattractive view that Fregean senses are either object-dependent or descriptive (Brown 2004, Evans 
1982, McDowell 1984, McDowell 1986). This related misconception will not be addressed on this 
occasion.
3. It is hardly a coincidence that advocates of the illusion version, such as Evans (1982) and McDowell 
(1986), are also among the main proponents of disjunctivism.
4. See, for example, Davidson 1989.
5. This may be the strategy of McCulloch 1988.
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6. Even philosophers who think that phenomenal content is representational agree (see, e.g., Tye 
1995).
7. It is not entirely clear why one would uphold the illusion view for the object of a thought and reject 
it for the property. The illusion-of-thought theorists owe a principled explanation for this asymmetry.
8. Likewise the empty thought-components appear to play the same syntactical and compositional 
roles as referring thought-components. To wit: (iii) ‘unicorns are fond of virgins’ and (iv) ‘virgins are 
fond of unicorns’ appear to have distinct, hence determinate, contents. The unicorn-hunter who believes 
(iii) may think of it as a reason to bring a virgin along to Kashmir (as bait). Someone who believes (iv), 
but not (iii) does not have this reason available. 
 A caveat: One could, perhaps inspired by Saul Kripke, object that the example is problematic be-
cause it is of the essence of unicorns—a creature of myth—that they do not exist. This objection could 
be dealt with by substituting the unicorns with some postulated—non-mythical—species, such as the 
yetis (Kripke 1980, pp. 23–24, 156–158).
9. This is too strong as stated. Of course, one could generate a second-order belief about one’s un-
conscious mental states by third-person methods—by observing one’s own behavior, by asking one’s 
shrink, etc.
10. Empirical studies indicate that primates and young children do not have a substantive concept of 
belief. Such subjects are unable to pass varieties of the so-called ‘false belief test.’ For a useful survey 
and meta-analysis, see Wellman, Cross and Watson 2001.
11. Some have taken such considerations about psychological explanation to speak in favor of individu-
alism. Gabriel Segal, for example, has argued from the existence of empty concepts to the conclusion 
that “the thesis that natural-kind concepts are world-dependent is false” (Segal 2000, p. 56). This view 
is shared by the version of anti-individualism which is promoted here. This is recognized by Segal. 
He is perfectly explicit that the arguments only apply to versions of anti-individualism which uphold 
some strong doctrine of ontological dependence of natural kind concepts. In particular, he is clear that 
the arguments do not compromise versions of anti-individualism which “ see more general relations 
to the environment as essential” (Segal 2000, p. 57). Given this recognition, the arguments based on 
reference failure do not in and off themselves speak in favor of individualism. These arguments clearly 
leave room a theory which is perfectly anti-individualistic despite the fact that it rejects the doctrine of 
ontological dependence. For a related criticism, see Hunter 2003, pp. 732–733.
 As mentioned, Segal recognizes all this. Indeed, this is why he provides a number of further argu-
ments, which do not involve no-reference cases, to compromise weaker versions of anti-individualism. 
Alas, a discussion of these arguments falls outside the scope of the present discussion.
12. It is, of course, not denied that the worldly mistake may be the source of a mistake about one’s own 
mental states. For example, Sally might have a false second-order thought ‘I just had a true belief that 
a table is red’ in an illusion case in which there is no table. But, as the case exemplifi es, the mistake 
about the worldly facts is the primary one. It explains the putative mistake about mental facts.
13. Interestingly, Peter Ludlow has motivated the view that there is a syntactical difference between 
referring and empty concepts. “The thesis may be radical, but I suggest that the externalist has good 
grounds for asserting that the syntactic states of a system can be and often are determined by environ-
mental circumstances” (Ludlow 2002). The ‘radical’ thesis pertains to no-reference cases: “The idea 
would be that a single physical system might have a syntactically simple representation for a name like 
‘Socrates’ in some environments—by hypothesis those where Socrates existed—and a more complex 
representation in other environments—those worlds where he did not exist” (Ludlow 2002).
 An anti-individualist should regard this idea as ‘radical’ because it appears to be at odds with an 
essential assumption of a Twin Earth argument. This is the assumption that all Earthian’s and the Twin 
Earthian’s internally specifi ed states are type-identical. For syntactically type-distinct states are not 
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internally type-identical. So, if Ludlow’s suggestion is right, there will not be any case in which an 
Earthian’s and a Dry Earthian’s respective thoughts are semantically type-distinct although they are 
syntactically (and hence internally) type-identical. Consequently, it seems that Ludlow’s suggestion 
undermines the basis for an anti-individualistic account of no-reference cases. That is a real worry. The 
purpose of this footnote is to call attention to it rather than to settle it.
14. Thanks to Tyler Burge for pressing the fi rst and third issue.
15. This comment only speaks to the historical development. No claim is made regarding whether the 
anti-descriptivist stance in philosophy of language or mind is philosophically more fundamental.
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